The instrumental stance describes the unique approach of homo sapiens to view things as instruments–or means–to achieve some end or goal.1 Here we will further explore this phenomenon in terms of the role it has played in the rise of civilization, the structure of the rationality it embodies, and its contrast with the non-instrumental.
In a way, much of history can be read as the story of instrumental activity. Early human societies, such as hunter-gatherers, are characterized by hunting and foraging and thus frequent movement, resulting in a more or less nomadic way of life. Over time, more efficient means (i.e., instruments2) of travel, hunting and foraging, cooking, shelter-construction, etc., are developed; here we recognize that instrumental activity and innovation is essentially technological activity.3 At some point, the coinciding of a sufficiently developed technical understanding and geographical viability, lead to the development of agriculture and animal domestication. Villages and towns come into being, themselves a result of further instrumental innovation. Trade between neighboring communities begins to occur, as do more efficient and organized forms of warfare. Class and social structures become more embedded in society. Cities, empires, and civilizations emerge–some are conquered by others–stronger or more developed. We could continue this story to the present day, but the role of instrumental thinking in the rise of civilization should at this point be clear.4
The rationality embodied in the instrumental stance involves the relationships between ends and means. The basic structure is the attempted identification of the best or most efficient means to reach a given end (or goal). “What do I want? How do I get it?” Furthermore, the relationship between ends and means involved in instrumental thinking is external and not internal. What does this mean? The relationship between a given end and the means through which it is achieved is external if the end can be clearly characterized independently of the means–that is, if the ends and means are separable or distinct.5 In the case of money: anything purchasable; the money used in the purchase and the product or service exchanged are entirely separate. The development of a net by primitive man to fish–and the fish caught by the net–are entirely separate. The technique of crop-rotation developed during the middle ages and the harvest produced from it are separate as well. Following up on examples from the Introduction to the Instrumental Stance: The relationships between business partners and the business itself, are separate. The sexual satisfaction of the playboy and the woman who is the object of it, are separate.6 The prayer, and that for which it was prayed–its object–are separate.7 These are all examples of things considered to be useful; things “used-for” something “other-than” themselves. Such is the rationality that lies behind the instrumental stance.8
Not all relationships between ends and means are separate or distinct, however. In this case, ends and means cannot be adequately characterized independently of each other. The relationship between them is, therefore, internal and not external. Thus, an end which cannot be characterized independently of the means necessary to achieve it must exist beyond, or outside, the scope of the instrumental, i.e., it must be non-instrumental. What does this mean? Take an activity such as watching the rising of the moon, or listening to a symphonic poem, such as the Isle of the Dead by Rachmaninoff. Here are two examples where the end (or purpose) of the activity–watching the moon rise, or listening to a symphony–cannot be adequately characterized independently of the means. In both cases the means employed and the end for the sake of which it is employed are one and the same thing. The means/end relationship is thus internal and not external. In other words, these activities are useless; they serve no purpose beyond themselves, they exist for their own sake–they are ends in themselves.9
The non-instrumental world–if I may coin such a phrase–is thus the world of beauty and love; the world of art, poetry, philosophy, and theology; the world of the good, the beautiful, and the noble. Things which are, properly speaking, useless.10 To once again invoke St. Augustine’s critique of the pagan religion of the Romans: the purpose of religion (he is referring to the superiority of Christianity) is not to obtain earthly temporal benefits–whether we want them or not–but to worship God as an end in itself.11
There are two worlds then, existing within the scope of the human: one is the world of work, the useful world of efficiency and profit, of external motives and utilitarian calculation–the world embodied by the instrumental stance. The other is the world of the useless, of goods for their own sake, and ends in themselves; the world of beauty and wonder and love; the world of contemplation, what the Greek’s called theoria. It is from the perspective of these two worlds, respectively, that we find mutual criticism: one accuses the other of being cruel, calculating, inhuman. The other is said to be detached from reality, clueless about what matters, useless. Like most perspectives, there are kernels of truth in both. It is my own view, however, that the highest affirmation of the human lies in one and not the other.12
Notes:
1. The tendency to instrumentalize the world was described very briefly in Introduction to The Instrumental Stance.
2. Note that “instruments” may refer to any form of means, be it a process of doing something, such as more efficient skinning of a deer, or the development of a fishing net with which to catch a greater quantity of fish, or some other form of means.
3. Or rather, technological activity is necessarily instrumental. Jacques Ellul provides a fascinating historical account of this phenomenon, from primitive times through the industrial revolution. See Jacques Ellul, The Technological Society.
4. There are radical changes in this form of thinking with the rise of industrialization, and the technological growth of the 20th century, some of which we will explore in the future. Again, I refer the reader to Ellul’s, The Technological Society.
5. I am indebted to Alasdair MacIntyre for his analysis of this. See Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue.
6. This is evident because, in this example, the woman may be “exchanged” for another, without changing the end-goal of sexual satisfaction. Introducing the notion of satisfaction or pleasure as an end or goal adds a certain amount of complexity to the relationships between ends and means. As we will see in the future, things and actions may be considered as such, or from a particular perspective. It is often the case that depending on the perspective of a person, the non-instrumental can become instrumental, and vice versa (see endnote #9).
7. I do not actually think that this is the purpose of prayer. But that many people today view prayer as instrumental is difficult to deny.
8. It is worth noting that this specific form of rationality is embodied by the activity of homo sapiens whether they know it or not. Put differently, it is not necessary that someone be able to articulate or explain a given paradigm or philosophical presupposition in order to embody it and live by it.
9. Such things, however, can always be corrupted. Suppose someone watches the moon rise or listens to a symphony because of some external reason: in the former, a photographer watches in order to capture the image and sell the prints, or in the latter, a student is assigned listening to the synphony as part of a school project. In both cases something which is an end in itself as such is reduced to a means.
10. Notice the negative connotation we experience upon seeing the word “useless”. The modern mind struggles to put such things into the category useless, because we have come to believe that useless things are worthless things. It may indeed be the case that the best things in life are useless, i.e., non-instrumental.
11. See St. Augustine, The City of God. The same point is made in a different way by Josef Pieper. See Josef Pieper, Leisure The Basis of Culture.
12. If it is not obvious, this will be explored in the future.