Aquinas – The Modern Frame

Toward a Theory of History

Change is the defining feature of history. By history, I mean human history; specifically, the history of the human world, which exists over and above–yet never entirely independent from–the physical and biological world.¹ As time unfolds the present is influenced by the past; what is, has been conditioned by what once was; the human world of today is a synthesis of the human world of yesterday. Just as any given moment holds the necessary conditions for what is possible in the future, the necessary conditions of the world we inhabit today existed in the past in some way. Today has developed and emerged from new combinations and novel instantiations of a multiplicity of conditions existing in the past. A given moment may be said to comprise a “whole”, out of which emerges a synthesis constituting a larger, more complex, whole. Thus, there is a directedness to the unfolding of history. Like the expansion of the universe or the arrow of time, it would appear history moves in a single direction.² This phenomenon–in which the totality of circumstances constituted within the human world influences and affects itself over time–I will call historical conditioning.³

An Introduction to Being and Existence in Modern and Pre-Modern Philosophy

One of the central questions of modern and contemporary philosophy is “What exists?” Do I exist? Does the material world exist? Does the soul exist? Do universals exist? Do numbers exist? Does God exist? Ancient and medieval philosophy, however, was not very concerned with these sorts of questions. Although these sorts of questions were raised and discussed on occasion, the Platonic and Aristotelian outlooks that dominated ancient and medieval philosophy in the West generally granted existence (or more precisely, being) to anything about which true and false statements could be made. The questions with which ancient and medieval philosophy were most concerned were not questions of existence, but rather questions of grounding, of which beings were more fundamental, and on what it means to be a being.¹ In this essay, I want to reflect on one facet of this basic difference in orientation between modern and pre-modern notions of reality. I want to focus on the difference in the way that the ancients and medievals, on the one hand, and us moderns, on the other, tend to think about what it means for something “to exist” or “to be.” While I will mainly talk about how “existence” or “being” is employed in the philosophical thinking typical of the pre-modern and modern West, I think reflecting on these issues will help us better understand key differences between pre-modern and modern worldviews in general.

Philosophy, Utility, and The Modern Frame

In taking a brief respite from my most recent string of essays, I wish to consider the subject of philosophy. Specifically its definition, but also its relationship to utility or what I have called instrumentality. With the turn of the modern epoch, the common understanding of philosophy has been transformed. Once the province of wisdom, it has metamorphosized into a creature of specialized knowledge–one that is increasingly called into question. In both the academic sphere and the common world of everyday life, philosophy is questioned on the basis of its utility or instrumentality.¹ And such questioning is paradigmatic of the modern frame. But philosophy cannot be so easily cast aside; its defense is deeper and more profound than many would-be critics realize. The French philosopher Etienne Gilson perhaps said it best when he wrote: “Philosophy always buries its undertakers.”² Along with Gilson, my understanding of philosophy here has been shaped most by Josef Pieper, and to a certain extent by William Vallicella.³

Education: Instrumentality and Specialization

Education in the West has taken many forms throughout history. Like philosophy, its genesis can be traced to ancient Greece, where the first schools of thought were recorded. The first rival conceptions of education–such as those advanced by the ancient sophists, Isocrates, and Plato¹–are in many ways mirrored in modernity, albeit in very different circumstances. Beginning in Greece we find tension with respect to education, which concerns the debate between theoretical and practical forms of higher learning, i.e., between disinterested truth and application or utility. Of course, there is an academic history of this thought, the aggregate of which has come to be known as the philosophy of education. It is not my intention, however, to explore the history of this thought here. It is rather to contrast the varying forms of higher education as they have existed across history in the West in terms of two specifics: instrumentality and specialization. Most important to this comparison will be the question of telos, that is, what is and what has been the goal or purpose of education? What is its raison d’être?

Beyond the Instrumental and Non-Instrumental: Some Thoughts on The Person

At this point the notion of goods as they relate to the instrumental and non-instrumental can be added to our considerations. I have spoken of two distinct “stances” or approaches to the world as adopted by homo sapiens. One views things¹ in terms of their purported usefulness or utility, of their instrumental value for the sake of some further end or goal. The other views things for their own sake, as ends in themselves, as such. Furthermore, it is the human person–conceived as a unique subject existing beyond or outside the instrumental and non-instrumental²–which adds yet another level of complexity to our understanding of these stances, particularly the instrumental.³