Eric G. Wilson’s little volume, Against Happiness, is a good introduction to the subject,1 except I would argue it isn’t about happiness. Or if it is, it’s about a superficial and degenerate form of it. What is today called happiness would have in premodern times been referred to as a kind of joy–a form of psychological satisfaction or pleasure.2 In the first book of The Histories, Herodotus tells of Solon’s answer to Croesus upon being asked who the happiest man in the world is. Croesus, the famously wealthy king of Lydia, fancies himself the man. But Solon names three unknown men–Tellus, Cleobis, and Biton–all of whom are dead.3 The question of how the dead may be happier than the living–and Solon is not attributing their happiness to one enjoyed in an afterlife–is one which highlights the major difference between modern and premodern–especially ancient–views of happiness. To be sure, one cannot do justice to the subject in the form of a short essay, however accurate. It is thus my purpose here to confine myself only to the major differences in the concept of happiness between the understandings of the ancient world, and that of the contemporary modern world.
Continue reading “Happiness: A Brief Contrast”Month: October 2019
Human Life as Enacted Narrative
We both reveal ourselves to, and encounter others, through action–through words and deeds. An important aspect of human action that has not yet been considered is its historic character. By historic I do not necessarily mean important, but enduring, permanent. What one does, echoes in eternity–not in the sense of the eschatological, though that may prove true–but in that of the final; once something is done, it cannot be undone. To wrong another person is to do something that cannot be erased;1 so too to be kind, or just. But considerations of merit aside, I refer also to those actions which may be considered the most insignificant just as much as those which may be pivotal to the narrative arc of one’s life. What emerges within the movement of a given life–built up from one’s words and deeds through time–is a kind of enacted narrative, a life story. And it is through bringing unity to the narrative of one’s life which partly answers the question: “What is the good life for man?”2
Continue reading “Human Life as Enacted Narrative”Human Action
Human action takes place within the space of the human world. But while the human world is the stage upon which human actions are performed, it also provides the context which renders our actions intelligible to others as well as ourselves. There is no such thing as an abstracted human action, existing apart and independently from its context–such a thing is unintelligible. Human actions, therefore, must possess the property of intelligibility.1 In order to avoid potential misunderstandings, it is important to remember that I am talking about those actions which are distinctively and characteristically human. Breathing could be construed as an action: the taking in of oxygen and expulsion of carbon dioxide by the lungs. But breathing is not a human action because it does not properly take place within the human world.2 Speech, however, is an example of human action, since to speak a language is to communicate within a given context of a shared social understanding. We must begin with considerations of human action if we wish to sufficiently understand not only the notions of virtue and practical rationality (ethics), and the narrative character of human life, but also to place ourselves in a position to evaluate competing views in ethics, personal identity, and others.
Continue reading “Human Action”