Freedom – The Modern Frame

Some Thoughts on the Limits of American Democracy

It is not an accident that the rise of democratic and republican forms of government in the modern period coincided with the rise of the public sphere of rational-critical debate.¹ This is particularly clear in the case of America, where the founding itself was the product of a rich and robust public discussion and debate. Although many members of the Constitutional Convention were not college-educated, they nonetheless were very well-read and informed.² At the time, it was even reported that some British booksellers were selling more law books in the colonies than in England.³ But although the genesis of government “of, by, and for the people” has its roots in a public sphere of rational-critical debate, such a foundation is equally necessary for the endurance and continued existence of such governments and societies. Yet today in America the public sphere of rational-critical debate has all but disappeared, in many ways existing only as a simulacrum of what it once was. For the most part, it has transformed into the mass media of opinions ready-made to consume and independent structures of sociological propaganda.⁴ This general weakening of the public sphere is connected to at least three socioeconomic factors, each of which in its own way undermines our ability as a society to participate in democratic behavior.

The Isolated Self and the Limits of Communication, Part I

In a previous essay, I offered some thoughts on the state of contemporary debate in America. At that time, debates over public health and economics (specifically in light of the unfolding COVID-19 pandemic) and systemic racism were front and center. Add to these the controversies over the 2020 U.S. presidential election and the events of January 6th in Washington D.C., and it is perhaps unsurprising that 2021 has followed the trajectory of 2020.¹ As far as the struggle to communicate is concerned, the problem has become even more pronounced and noticeable. In many ways, the breakdowns in communication over the past year have progressed. Progressed, in the sense that they have reached a new stage of development–one that is perhaps far more dangerous than many people realize. Such failures in communication lead to a peculiar form of isolation, one that is simultaneously beholden to and a consequence of various forms of propaganda and factionalism. For reasons which will become apparent, this essay is more or less an informal continuation of my previous essay, Theoretical Frameworks and the Limits of Communication. As before, this is an initial and undeveloped attempt to shed light on a situation that is in many ways unintelligible.

A Sketch of Contemporary Hookup Culture

The rise of hookup culture in contemporary America appears to be closely bound up with the rise of freedom as an ultimate value.¹ In my essays on cultural existentialism, I have attempted to show the centrality that this “ultimate value” has come to occupy today–as witnessed by the view of the self as “unencumbered”–as well as its interconnectedness to what I have called preference satisfaction.² The phenomenon of hookup culture as a contemporary subculture, especially among the demographic of young adults, is a poignant example of this.³ Hookup culture itself is an instance of a broader set of changes involving relationships, which I will not attempt to address here. For the time being, I offer the following brief and preliminary thoughts.

Cultural Existentialism: Instances and Instrumentality

While the previous essays¹ laid the foundation and began exploring some of the architecture of what I have called cultural existentialism, at this point the following can be offered as a working definition: Cultural existentialism is the phenomenon that views the individual as entirely free and unencumbered–by history, family, community, tradition, inherited ideas, et al.–and, therefore, free to live and define themselves as they see fit; the sole author of their life.² In this essay, I want to explore some of the more outward forms of cultural existentialism, as well as its relation to what I have called the instrumental stance. In so doing, I hope to shed some light on the question of the more recent origins of this phenomenon. Again, my focus will remain on America.

Cultural Existentialism: The Absurdity of American Individualism

In the previous essay I hoped to make clear the connection between the phenomenon of cultural existentialism with that of its formal counterpart–the philosophy of Existentialism. Again, I believe the connection between them is one of similarity rather than direct causality, and that the primary difference between the two is merely the extent to which they are articulated. Still, the average person is not a philosopher–let alone Sartre–so in many ways the accusation that cultural existentialism is widely embodied but not articulated is unfair. For a more common view of cultural existentialism, I would like to turn to the excellent work of the sociologist Robert Bellah, and some of his colleagues, such as Richard Madsen, William M. Sullivan, Ann Swindler, and Steven M. Tipton.¹ Much of their research, findings, and collaboration on American culture from the early 1980s will help color the outline I have sketched thus far.

Introduction to Cultural Existentialism

At the close of my essay The Individual and The Human World, I spoke briefly about the contemporary West–and America in particular–as a place where “individuals determine and create themselves in their own image–rooted in the satisfaction of their own preferences–the sole authors of their lives.”¹ This phenomenon, which is admittedly broad and multifaceted, has become hegemonic in the contemporary West. Here I will attempt to explore some of its contours, though certain details will have to be postponed for the time being. As a kind of umbrella term, I will refer to this state of affairs as cultural existentialism.²

The Good, Liberalism, and the Role of Preferences

The modern contemporary world of the West is characterized by liberalism.¹ Perhaps the most unique aspect of liberal modernity is that it is structured in such a way that it neither provides nor advocates any overriding conception of the human good.² This has been discussed by many writers, including Alasdair MacIntyre, Charles Taylor and Michael Sandel.³ What is good is left to the individual to decide, and this is done through the expression or pursuit of preferences. Within the liberal framework the concepts of goods and preferences are interchangeable, their criterion and validity being tied almost exclusively to the person(s) or subject(s) in question, i.e., the relationship between goods and the individual is internal and not external.⁴ Thus, there is no agreed-upon conception of “the good”. Indeed, on the modern view there is no such thing, there is only your good and my good, the good of this group and the good of that group–each of which may be understood as incommensurable with certain others.

Human Action

Human action takes place within the space of the human world. But while the human world is the stage upon which human actions are performed, it also provides the context which renders our actions intelligible to others as well as ourselves. There is no such thing as an abstracted human action, existing apart and independently from its context–such a thing is unintelligible. Human actions, therefore, must possess the property of intelligibility.¹ In order to avoid potential misunderstandings, it is important to remember that I am talking about those actions which are distinctively and characteristically human. Breathing could be construed as an action: the taking in of oxygen and expulsion of carbon dioxide by the lungs. But breathing is not a human action because it does not properly take place within the human world.² Speech, however, is an example of human action, since to speak a language is to communicate within a given context of a shared social understanding. We must begin with considerations of human action if we wish to sufficiently understand not only the notions of virtue and practical rationality (ethics), and the narrative character of human life, but also to place ourselves in a position to evaluate competing views in ethics, personal identity, and others.

Preliminary Thoughts on How We Adopt The Modern Frame

Something that has been asserted in both the Introduction and A General Overview is the idea that modernity “presses upon us certain presuppositions, paradigms, and ways of thinking about our world and ourselves”. What this means, exactly, and how it happens may not be entirely clear. Nor is it obvious what sort of things I am referring to, though the list of ideas and circumstances mentioned in the overview should offer some clues.

A General Overview

The modern contemporary world has its own characteristic understandings, paradigms,¹ and circumstances. We think in terms of the ideas that modernity has thrust upon us, and most of us have no choice in the matter because we do so without knowing it. The ideas and ways of understanding the world and ourselves that are unique to our time in the West is what I call “the modern frame”.