Aristotle – The Modern Frame

Toward a Theory of History

Change is the defining feature of history. By history, I mean human history; specifically, the history of the human world, which exists over and above–yet never entirely independent from–the physical and biological world.¹ As time unfolds the present is influenced by the past; what is, has been conditioned by what once was; the human world of today is a synthesis of the human world of yesterday. Just as any given moment holds the necessary conditions for what is possible in the future, the necessary conditions of the world we inhabit today existed in the past in some way. Today has developed and emerged from new combinations and novel instantiations of a multiplicity of conditions existing in the past. A given moment may be said to comprise a “whole”, out of which emerges a synthesis constituting a larger, more complex, whole. Thus, there is a directedness to the unfolding of history. Like the expansion of the universe or the arrow of time, it would appear history moves in a single direction.² This phenomenon–in which the totality of circumstances constituted within the human world influences and affects itself over time–I will call historical conditioning.³

Some Thoughts on the Limits of American Democracy

It is not an accident that the rise of democratic and republican forms of government in the modern period coincided with the rise of the public sphere of rational-critical debate.¹ This is particularly clear in the case of America, where the founding itself was the product of a rich and robust public discussion and debate. Although many members of the Constitutional Convention were not college-educated, they nonetheless were very well-read and informed.² At the time, it was even reported that some British booksellers were selling more law books in the colonies than in England.³ But although the genesis of government “of, by, and for the people” has its roots in a public sphere of rational-critical debate, such a foundation is equally necessary for the endurance and continued existence of such governments and societies. Yet today in America the public sphere of rational-critical debate has all but disappeared, in many ways existing only as a simulacrum of what it once was. For the most part, it has transformed into the mass media of opinions ready-made to consume and independent structures of sociological propaganda.⁴ This general weakening of the public sphere is connected to at least three socioeconomic factors, each of which in its own way undermines our ability as a society to participate in democratic behavior.

An Introduction to Being and Existence in Modern and Pre-Modern Philosophy

One of the central questions of modern and contemporary philosophy is “What exists?” Do I exist? Does the material world exist? Does the soul exist? Do universals exist? Do numbers exist? Does God exist? Ancient and medieval philosophy, however, was not very concerned with these sorts of questions. Although these sorts of questions were raised and discussed on occasion, the Platonic and Aristotelian outlooks that dominated ancient and medieval philosophy in the West generally granted existence (or more precisely, being) to anything about which true and false statements could be made. The questions with which ancient and medieval philosophy were most concerned were not questions of existence, but rather questions of grounding, of which beings were more fundamental, and on what it means to be a being.¹ In this essay, I want to reflect on one facet of this basic difference in orientation between modern and pre-modern notions of reality. I want to focus on the difference in the way that the ancients and medievals, on the one hand, and us moderns, on the other, tend to think about what it means for something “to exist” or “to be.” While I will mainly talk about how “existence” or “being” is employed in the philosophical thinking typical of the pre-modern and modern West, I think reflecting on these issues will help us better understand key differences between pre-modern and modern worldviews in general.

Philosophy, Utility, and The Modern Frame

In taking a brief respite from my most recent string of essays, I wish to consider the subject of philosophy. Specifically its definition, but also its relationship to utility or what I have called instrumentality. With the turn of the modern epoch, the common understanding of philosophy has been transformed. Once the province of wisdom, it has metamorphosized into a creature of specialized knowledge–one that is increasingly called into question. In both the academic sphere and the common world of everyday life, philosophy is questioned on the basis of its utility or instrumentality.¹ And such questioning is paradigmatic of the modern frame. But philosophy cannot be so easily cast aside; its defense is deeper and more profound than many would-be critics realize. The French philosopher Etienne Gilson perhaps said it best when he wrote: “Philosophy always buries its undertakers.”² Along with Gilson, my understanding of philosophy here has been shaped most by Josef Pieper, and to a certain extent by William Vallicella.³

Some Further Thoughts on Modern Education

Given what I have said so far about education in the West, specifically about ancient and medieval forms of higher education as they relate to instrumentality and specialization, my treatment of modern forms of higher education needs to be further explored and expanded upon. Here I will continue the general focus on higher education and concerns of instrumentality and specialization, but with an exclusive focus on the modern epoch.

Education: Instrumentality and Specialization

Education in the West has taken many forms throughout history. Like philosophy, its genesis can be traced to ancient Greece, where the first schools of thought were recorded. The first rival conceptions of education–such as those advanced by the ancient sophists, Isocrates, and Plato¹–are in many ways mirrored in modernity, albeit in very different circumstances. Beginning in Greece we find tension with respect to education, which concerns the debate between theoretical and practical forms of higher learning, i.e., between disinterested truth and application or utility. Of course, there is an academic history of this thought, the aggregate of which has come to be known as the philosophy of education. It is not my intention, however, to explore the history of this thought here. It is rather to contrast the varying forms of higher education as they have existed across history in the West in terms of two specifics: instrumentality and specialization. Most important to this comparison will be the question of telos, that is, what is and what has been the goal or purpose of education? What is its raison d’être?

Happiness: A Brief Contrast

Eric G. Wilson’s little volume, Against Happiness, is a good introduction to the subject,¹ except I would argue it isn’t about happiness. Or if it is, it’s about a superficial and degenerate form of it. What is today called happiness would have in premodern times been referred to as a kind of joy–a form of psychological satisfaction or pleasure.² In the first book of The Histories, Herodotus tells of Solon’s answer to Croesus upon being asked who the happiest man in the world is. Croesus, the famously wealthy king of Lydia, fancies himself the man. But Solon names three unknown men–Tellus, Cleobis, and Biton–all of whom are dead.³ The question of how the dead may be happier than the living–and Solon is not attributing their happiness to one enjoyed in an afterlife–is one which highlights the major difference between modern and premodern–especially ancient–views of happiness. To be sure, one cannot do justice to the subject in the form of a short essay, however accurate. It is thus my purpose here to confine myself only to the major differences in the concept of happiness between the understandings of the ancient world, and that of the contemporary modern world.

The Individual and The Human World

Up to this point, I have used the word “world” without disclosing what is meant by it.¹ Yet this should have gone more or less unnoticed, since it is part of the nature of our existence to be embedded within our world, and thus its context provides us with many underlying assumptions which we take for granted. The world I am speaking of is what I will call the human world, which makes up “a world within the world”, so to speak. It is a world which–though metaphysically inseparable from the physical and especially biological aspects of our existence–nonetheless transcends them. An understanding of the depth and complexity of this will be necessary if we are to make certain concepts and observations sufficiently intelligible, and its articulation will help us better understand our situation, placing us in a better position to evaluate the phenomena we are considering. In this initial exposition, I am drawing heavily upon the work of Hannah Arendt and Raymond Tallis.²

Beyond the Instrumental and Non-Instrumental: Some Thoughts on The Person

At this point the notion of goods as they relate to the instrumental and non-instrumental can be added to our considerations. I have spoken of two distinct “stances” or approaches to the world as adopted by homo sapiens. One views things¹ in terms of their purported usefulness or utility, of their instrumental value for the sake of some further end or goal. The other views things for their own sake, as ends in themselves, as such. Furthermore, it is the human person–conceived as a unique subject existing beyond or outside the instrumental and non-instrumental²–which adds yet another level of complexity to our understanding of these stances, particularly the instrumental.³

Introduction to the Instrumental Stance

Investigation of the instrumental stance¹ is necessary to understand the contemporary world. Various terms may be used to describe this phenomenon, such as (yet not limited to) means/end rationalism, instrumental reason or rationality, utilitarianism,² or utility. I will simply refer to it as the instrumental stance, as it describes a specific “stance” or approach to the world.