Liberalism – The Modern Frame

Toward a Theory of History

Change is the defining feature of history. By history, I mean human history; specifically, the history of the human world, which exists over and above–yet never entirely independent from–the physical and biological world.¹ As time unfolds the present is influenced by the past; what is, has been conditioned by what once was; the human world of today is a synthesis of the human world of yesterday. Just as any given moment holds the necessary conditions for what is possible in the future, the necessary conditions of the world we inhabit today existed in the past in some way. Today has developed and emerged from new combinations and novel instantiations of a multiplicity of conditions existing in the past. A given moment may be said to comprise a “whole”, out of which emerges a synthesis constituting a larger, more complex, whole. Thus, there is a directedness to the unfolding of history. Like the expansion of the universe or the arrow of time, it would appear history moves in a single direction.² This phenomenon–in which the totality of circumstances constituted within the human world influences and affects itself over time–I will call historical conditioning.³

The Isolated Self and the Limits of Communication, Part III

Up to this point, I have considered the isolated self as a phenomenon understood on the basis of hardening theoretical frameworks situated within the more general landscape of the contemporary struggle to communicate. The quest for certainty and calm in a world marked by historic levels of uncertainty and anxiety–as witnessed by the work of Erich Fromm and Jacques Ellul–has helped elucidate some of the psychological basis, or impetus, behind the emergence of this phenomenon.¹ Perhaps equally important is the commodification of rational-critical debate, as explored by Jürgen Habermas, which has become more pronounced today than ever before. Taken together, both help shed necessary light on the emergence and continued endurance of the isolated self and the factionalism it gives rise to.² But the picture I am attempting to paint in these essays will not be complete until a proper consideration of propaganda has taken place.³ Indeed, everything that has been said up to now has laid the groundwork for an understanding of propaganda, which will further bring into contrast the problem that we, as a society, face. In so doing, Jacques Ellul’s work on the subject will be my primary resource, especially when considered in light of the relatively recent development of the internet.

An Introduction to Consumer Society

Our modern lives have become increasingly characterized by consumption. This is not to say that we merely aspire to consume, but that a life of consuming has itself (to varying degrees) become necessary in contemporary Western society.¹ Indeed, the everyday consumption of products and services has gained a prominence hitherto unknown. No sooner are the objects of our desire obtained, before others, new and unforeseen, present themselves. The ends of consumer society lure us onward and “upward”, into a sort of Sisyphean cycle.² In previous essays I have mentioned consumer society, but have yet failed to offer a more comprehensive explanation of what I mean. What exactly I mean, as well as some account of both how it developed and some of its effects, is what I hope to begin exploring in this essay.³

Happiness: A Brief Critique

I have said before that the implicit yet common understanding of happiness today is preference satisfaction.¹ It is the view that sees the standards of happiness to be internal to the agent, existing solely within the purview of the individual. “To each, his own.” This is closely associated with what I have described as cultural existentialism.² The increasing pluralism of Western society has birthed a state of affairs in which there is no longer a common understanding of the good.³ What remains is the individual’s assessment, protected by law–insofar as he or she does not impinge on the rights of others. But if this view of happiness is pushed to its limits, as it were, the ramifications are unsettling, to say the least.⁴

Cultural Existentialism: Instances and Instrumentality

While the previous essays¹ laid the foundation and began exploring some of the architecture of what I have called cultural existentialism, at this point the following can be offered as a working definition: Cultural existentialism is the phenomenon that views the individual as entirely free and unencumbered–by history, family, community, tradition, inherited ideas, et al.–and, therefore, free to live and define themselves as they see fit; the sole author of their life.² In this essay, I want to explore some of the more outward forms of cultural existentialism, as well as its relation to what I have called the instrumental stance. In so doing, I hope to shed some light on the question of the more recent origins of this phenomenon. Again, my focus will remain on America.

Cultural Existentialism: The Absurdity of American Individualism

In the previous essay I hoped to make clear the connection between the phenomenon of cultural existentialism with that of its formal counterpart–the philosophy of Existentialism. Again, I believe the connection between them is one of similarity rather than direct causality, and that the primary difference between the two is merely the extent to which they are articulated. Still, the average person is not a philosopher–let alone Sartre–so in many ways the accusation that cultural existentialism is widely embodied but not articulated is unfair. For a more common view of cultural existentialism, I would like to turn to the excellent work of the sociologist Robert Bellah, and some of his colleagues, such as Richard Madsen, William M. Sullivan, Ann Swindler, and Steven M. Tipton.¹ Much of their research, findings, and collaboration on American culture from the early 1980s will help color the outline I have sketched thus far.

Introduction to Cultural Existentialism

At the close of my essay The Individual and The Human World, I spoke briefly about the contemporary West–and America in particular–as a place where “individuals determine and create themselves in their own image–rooted in the satisfaction of their own preferences–the sole authors of their lives.”¹ This phenomenon, which is admittedly broad and multifaceted, has become hegemonic in the contemporary West. Here I will attempt to explore some of its contours, though certain details will have to be postponed for the time being. As a kind of umbrella term, I will refer to this state of affairs as cultural existentialism.²

Theoretical Frameworks and the Limits of Communication

Among the starkest contrasts brought into view in the wake of 2020 (as it has unfolded thus far) can be seen in the struggle to communicate on a meaningful level. The United States in particular has witnessed an increasingly shrill level of debate over the unfolding and handling of the COVID-19 pandemic, the economic repercussions arising therefrom, and the widespread protesting in response to various forms of systemic racism. What is most alarming to me about the many related debates and discussions, which I have witnessed both privately and publicly, is the extent to which they appear interminable and incommensurable.¹ It is not merely that people disagree, it is that they appear unable to actually communicate meaningfully. Here I wish to explore, in (regrettably) inchoate form, one possible reason for this.²

Some Further Thoughts on Modern Education

Given what I have said so far about education in the West, specifically about ancient and medieval forms of higher education as they relate to instrumentality and specialization, my treatment of modern forms of higher education needs to be further explored and expanded upon. Here I will continue the general focus on higher education and concerns of instrumentality and specialization, but with an exclusive focus on the modern epoch.

The Good, Liberalism, and the Role of Preferences

The modern contemporary world of the West is characterized by liberalism.¹ Perhaps the most unique aspect of liberal modernity is that it is structured in such a way that it neither provides nor advocates any overriding conception of the human good.² This has been discussed by many writers, including Alasdair MacIntyre, Charles Taylor and Michael Sandel.³ What is good is left to the individual to decide, and this is done through the expression or pursuit of preferences. Within the liberal framework the concepts of goods and preferences are interchangeable, their criterion and validity being tied almost exclusively to the person(s) or subject(s) in question, i.e., the relationship between goods and the individual is internal and not external.⁴ Thus, there is no agreed-upon conception of “the good”. Indeed, on the modern view there is no such thing, there is only your good and my good, the good of this group and the good of that group–each of which may be understood as incommensurable with certain others.