Essays – Page 3 – The Modern Frame

Education: Instrumentality and Specialization

Education in the West has taken many forms throughout history. Like philosophy, its genesis can be traced to ancient Greece, where the first schools of thought were recorded. The first rival conceptions of education–such as those advanced by the ancient sophists, Isocrates, and Plato¹–are in many ways mirrored in modernity, albeit in very different circumstances. Beginning in Greece we find tension with respect to education, which concerns the debate between theoretical and practical forms of higher learning, i.e., between disinterested truth and application or utility. Of course, there is an academic history of this thought, the aggregate of which has come to be known as the philosophy of education. It is not my intention, however, to explore the history of this thought here. It is rather to contrast the varying forms of higher education as they have existed across history in the West in terms of two specifics: instrumentality and specialization. Most important to this comparison will be the question of telos, that is, what is and what has been the goal or purpose of education? What is its raison d’être?

The Good, Liberalism, and the Role of Preferences

The modern contemporary world of the West is characterized by liberalism.¹ Perhaps the most unique aspect of liberal modernity is that it is structured in such a way that it neither provides nor advocates any overriding conception of the human good.² This has been discussed by many writers, including Alasdair MacIntyre, Charles Taylor and Michael Sandel.³ What is good is left to the individual to decide, and this is done through the expression or pursuit of preferences. Within the liberal framework the concepts of goods and preferences are interchangeable, their criterion and validity being tied almost exclusively to the person(s) or subject(s) in question, i.e., the relationship between goods and the individual is internal and not external.⁴ Thus, there is no agreed-upon conception of “the good”. Indeed, on the modern view there is no such thing, there is only your good and my good, the good of this group and the good of that group–each of which may be understood as incommensurable with certain others.

Happiness: A Brief Contrast

Eric G. Wilson’s little volume, Against Happiness, is a good introduction to the subject,¹ except I would argue it isn’t about happiness. Or if it is, it’s about a superficial and degenerate form of it. What is today called happiness would have in premodern times been referred to as a kind of joy–a form of psychological satisfaction or pleasure.² In the first book of The Histories, Herodotus tells of Solon’s answer to Croesus upon being asked who the happiest man in the world is. Croesus, the famously wealthy king of Lydia, fancies himself the man. But Solon names three unknown men–Tellus, Cleobis, and Biton–all of whom are dead.³ The question of how the dead may be happier than the living–and Solon is not attributing their happiness to one enjoyed in an afterlife–is one which highlights the major difference between modern and premodern–especially ancient–views of happiness. To be sure, one cannot do justice to the subject in the form of a short essay, however accurate. It is thus my purpose here to confine myself only to the major differences in the concept of happiness between the understandings of the ancient world, and that of the contemporary modern world.

Human Life as Enacted Narrative

We both reveal ourselves to, and encounter others, through action–through words and deeds. An important aspect of human action that has not yet been considered is its historic character. By historic I do not necessarily mean important, but enduring, permanent. What one does, echoes in eternity–not in the sense of the eschatological, though that may prove true–but in that of the final; once something is done, it cannot be undone. To wrong another person is to do something that cannot be erased;¹ so too to be kind, or just. But considerations of merit aside, I refer also to those actions which may be considered the most insignificant just as much as those which may be pivotal to the narrative arc of one’s life. What emerges within the movement of a given life–built up from one’s words and deeds through time–is a kind of enacted narrative, a life story. And it is through bringing unity to the narrative of one’s life which partly answers the question: “What is the good life for man?”²

Human Action

Human action takes place within the space of the human world. But while the human world is the stage upon which human actions are performed, it also provides the context which renders our actions intelligible to others as well as ourselves. There is no such thing as an abstracted human action, existing apart and independently from its context–such a thing is unintelligible. Human actions, therefore, must possess the property of intelligibility.¹ In order to avoid potential misunderstandings, it is important to remember that I am talking about those actions which are distinctively and characteristically human. Breathing could be construed as an action: the taking in of oxygen and expulsion of carbon dioxide by the lungs. But breathing is not a human action because it does not properly take place within the human world.² Speech, however, is an example of human action, since to speak a language is to communicate within a given context of a shared social understanding. We must begin with considerations of human action if we wish to sufficiently understand not only the notions of virtue and practical rationality (ethics), and the narrative character of human life, but also to place ourselves in a position to evaluate competing views in ethics, personal identity, and others.

The Individual and The Human World

Up to this point, I have used the word “world” without disclosing what is meant by it.¹ Yet this should have gone more or less unnoticed, since it is part of the nature of our existence to be embedded within our world, and thus its context provides us with many underlying assumptions which we take for granted. The world I am speaking of is what I will call the human world, which makes up “a world within the world”, so to speak. It is a world which–though metaphysically inseparable from the physical and especially biological aspects of our existence–nonetheless transcends them. An understanding of the depth and complexity of this will be necessary if we are to make certain concepts and observations sufficiently intelligible, and its articulation will help us better understand our situation, placing us in a better position to evaluate the phenomena we are considering. In this initial exposition, I am drawing heavily upon the work of Hannah Arendt and Raymond Tallis.²

A Sketch of The Workaday World

We live in an age of work for work’s sake, of production, acquisition, and consumption, of income and expenses, GDP and unemployment percentages. Production, acquisition, and consumption have come to be the definitive organizing principles of our lives, conceived–or rather, lived out–as ends in themselves.¹ This provides modern man with what the Greek’s called telos–an end or purpose–and thus structures our lives in a specific way. The tasks of income, wealth, and its management become our primary concerns, and within this Economic sphere, efficiency likewise becomes an end in itself. This situation is unprecedented in history.²

Beyond the Instrumental and Non-Instrumental: Some Thoughts on The Person

At this point the notion of goods as they relate to the instrumental and non-instrumental can be added to our considerations. I have spoken of two distinct “stances” or approaches to the world as adopted by homo sapiens. One views things¹ in terms of their purported usefulness or utility, of their instrumental value for the sake of some further end or goal. The other views things for their own sake, as ends in themselves, as such. Furthermore, it is the human person–conceived as a unique subject existing beyond or outside the instrumental and non-instrumental²–which adds yet another level of complexity to our understanding of these stances, particularly the instrumental.³

The Instrumental Stance: Analysis and Contrast

The instrumental stance describes the unique approach of homo sapiens to view things as instruments–or means–to achieve some end or goal.¹ Here we will further explore this phenomenon in terms of the role it has played in the rise of civilization, the structure of the rationality it embodies, and its contrast with the non-instrumental.

Introduction to the Instrumental Stance

Investigation of the instrumental stance¹ is necessary to understand the contemporary world. Various terms may be used to describe this phenomenon, such as (yet not limited to) means/end rationalism, instrumental reason or rationality, utilitarianism,² or utility. I will simply refer to it as the instrumental stance, as it describes a specific “stance” or approach to the world.