Education: Instrumentality and Specialization

Education in the West has taken many forms throughout history. Like philosophy, its genesis can be traced to ancient Greece, where the first schools of thought were recorded. The first rival conceptions of education–such as those advanced by the ancient sophists, Isocrates, and Plato1–are in many ways mirrored in modernity, albeit in very different circumstances. Beginning in Greece we find tension with respect to education, which concerns the debate between theoretical and practical forms of higher learning, i.e., between disinterested truth and application or utility. Of course, there is an academic history of this thought, the aggregate of which has come to be known as the philosophy of education. It is not my intention, however, to explore the history of this thought here. It is rather to contrast the varying forms of higher education as they have existed across history in the West in terms of two specifics: instrumentality and specialization. Most important to this comparison will be the question of telos, that is, what is and what has been the goal or purpose of education? What is its raison d’être?

The lower forms of education have historically been private. In ancient Greece, for instance, there was no public system of education as we would call it today, at least not one controlled by the political structures of the time.2 Although there were standards of education imposed by the culture, childhood education was private and took the form of independent tutoring. Children were instructed in reading, writing, mathematics, cultural studies (history, poetry, music), as well as physical gymnastics. The goal was to develop well-rounded citizens, capable of active participation in community life, democracy, politics, and military affairs. Higher education expanded upon the lower and gained prominence in Athens during the 5th century BC when schools of rhetoric and philosophy began to appear.3

The schools of thought in ancient Greece were a focal point for the birth of philosophy. The word itself comes from combining the Greek philo, meaning “love of”, with sophia, or “wisdom”. It is thus the original understanding of the concept to mean the love of wisdom. Wisdom is equated with knowledge, and knowledge with reality or truth. Philosophy is, therefore, the seeking, or quest, for an understanding of the way things are. It is man’s attempt to discern truth, to apprehend reality. In doing so the Greeks made use of mathematics, logic, science,4 rhetoric, ethics, politics, metaphysics, history, et al. What is striking about this understanding of philosophy is that it is very broad (non-specialized), and includes many subjects and pursuits which today we would not normally associate with philosophy. It is also worth noting that philosophy is here understood as a non-instrumental good. It’s end or telos–truth, wisdom, apprehension of the way things are–is an end in itself. This is more or less the picture of philosophy inherited from the classical world, particularly that of Plato and Aristotle. Yet even in ancient Greece, when philosophy was perhaps most pure, this picture was not without challenges and competing viewpoints.

The most popular challenge to the classical conception of philosophy in ancient Greece was embodied by the sophists. The sophists were among the first teachers in history. They relied on rhetoric and skill in persuasion, and are purported to have offered instruction on a wide variety of subjects. Though virtue and wisdom were among their offerings, rhetoric and oratory was their primary focus. What most distinguished the sophists is that the education they offered was practical. It was offered as a means to earthly success: to ruling and power. Isocrates was a sophist, though his vision of education was more far-reaching than many of his contemporaries. His view was nonetheless utilitarian: the good is the useful. Education is a preparation for life, and the purely intellectual was ruled out.5 Theorizers, such as Plato–in Isocrates view–deal in finespun speculations and lifeless abstractions. The sophists in general–and Isocrates school of Rhetoric in particular–were thus means to an education which was necessarily instrumental.

It was Aristotle who bridged the conceptual gap between these two poles, though it should also be noted that Aristotle viewed the highest and most distinctive human activity to be the contemplation of truth.6 And it is characteristic of such activity that it is non-instrumental. But education cannot be entirely stripped from practical life. Both Plato and Aristotle were interested in education with an eye to the good of society, and to ruling and governing. The goals which were proper to education, in their view–and I am certainly simplifying things here–were bound up with the cultivation of character and virtue. Thus goodness is the standard upon which education is to be evaluated.7 This contrasts sharply with the sophistic ideal of success, which is not limited by ideas of virtue or goodness. Isocrates is an interesting example because as a sophist he held the ideals of rhetoric and oratory, but in such a way that still existed within a structure of the good of society (conceived in instrumental terms) and not a mere means to personal power or glory.

In some ways, it was the unique structure of the Political sphere that had developed in the Greek city-states, such as the polis and democracy, which allowed instrumental forms of education to grow and develop.8 An education in rhetoric and oratory could enable a talented free-born Greek the opportunity to gain honor and prestige, through performance at the assembly (ecclesia) or in the law courts. As we will see, without a certain political or legal structure instrumental forms of education remain somewhat marginal. This was mirrored some centuries later in the Roman Empire, which was perhaps the most political civilization we have known.9 As such, and combined with the pragmatism inherent in the Roman psyche, higher forms of education were specifically concerned with the subjects of rhetoric and oratory.10 Again, as instruments of success and power at home in the Political sphere.11

With the decline of Roman power, things began to change. As the Western Empire disintegrated, foreign peoples and cultures, such as the Vandals and Goths, came to occupy the regions of Western Europe once united by a centralized political structure. The contraction of the Political sphere resulted in the emergence of a patchwork of small kingdoms, general disorganization of society, and the reemergence of small isolated communities.12 Leadership which was badly needed came from the Catholic Church–the only surviving institution–which contained a clergy made up of nearly all the remaining literate and educated members of society. Concentrations of knowledge and learning were largely relocated to monasteries, which for the most part became the caretakers of Western learning and intellectual heritage.13 In the absence of a unified political structure, instrumental forms of higher learning (such as rhetoric) were held in check. What did expand unsurprisingly in the monastic setting of the early Middle Ages was biblical and theological study, itself non-instrumental. Although classical works were copied by hand almost continuously, this was mainly a process to help the scribe (also monk) learn the Latin language and not an exercise in the study of the content being copied.14 The early Middle Ages were therefore characterized by an expansion of the Religious sphere in the form of leadership and higher education, the latter becoming closely interwoven with theology.

By the end of the early Middle Ages, the Political sphere once again began to expand, but this time intimately connected with the Religious sphere in the form of a close working relationship between ecclesiastical and secular authorities. The 11th to the 13th century saw dramatic changes in the growth and complexity of government and legal institutions as well as those of the Catholic Church.15 Among these changes is the Norman conquest of England and subsequent effects arising therefrom, the Investiture Controversy in Germany and England, the Gregorian Reforms, attempts to develop comprehensive and organized legal systems, the rediscovery of the Digest of the Corpus Juris Civilis of Emperor Justinian I, the collections of canon law by Gratian, the signing of the Magna Carta, and so forth. Circumstances of this sort led to an influx of legal studies and specialization. It was at the medieval university that instrumental ends were reintroduced into higher education, largely in the form of legal professionals and jurisprudence, both secular and ecclesiastical.16 The University of Bologna is an ideal example.17 The medieval university also carried non-instrumental learning to new heights. By this time the study of theology had developed into a very large and complex area of specialization.18 The method of dialectic embodied in scholasticism reached its high point in the work of St. Thomas Aquinas, who was among the first philosopher-theologians to have access to Aristotelian writings that had been translated into Latin directly from Greek in the 13th century. The emergence of Aristotle’s writings in Europe caused furious and heated debates, as much of Christian thought hitherto had been rooted in a kind of Augustinian-Platonism. The bishop of Paris at the time, Étienne Tempier, even went so far as to formally condemn certain tenets of Aristotelean thought, including some of Aquinas’ work.19 Nonetheless, it was Aquinas’ position that Aristotelianism provided a clearer picture of reality than did other systems of thought.

Although the modern era saw further developments in jurisprudence and the practice of law, such considerations can safely be dropped from the discussion, both for considerations of brevity and because they add nothing new to the current discussion. I will only note that the relationship between religious and secular authority has been sundered in the modern era, and as such, the legal and political power dynamic is vastly different from the Middle Ages.

The greatest impact of the modern era on higher education is the enormous expansion of the Economic sphere, to such an extent that it very nearly encroaches upon every facet of life. The increases in the movement of peoples, of trade; the great explosion of production set loose by the Industrial Revolution, the developments and revolutions in technology, have all led to changes never before seen in the human world.20 In terms of higher education, it now exists as a near-exclusivity of instrumentality. In other words, its purpose, its reason for being, is to procure the credentials needed to secure an income.21 It has become almost completely instrumental, something to be used-for-what-is-other-than-itself. Learning for its own sake has thus become extremely rare, though it does still exist in some circles.22 Specialization has also developed to an extent never before seen. It has reached a point in some fields that specialists are able to communicate effectively about a given subject only with other specialists. A situation that has led to challenges of translation and communication.23 It is indeed the modern era which has ushered in an unprecedented level of instrumentality and specialization in higher learning. Whether this is good or not is, of course, a separate question.

See also, Some Further Thoughts on Modern Education.


Notes:

1. Both Plato and Isocrates opposed the sophists, though their means of combating them differed. Where Isocrates still believed in the virtues of rhetoric, and thus largely remained a sophist himself, Plato did not. See Isocrates, Against the Sophists and Plato, Gorgias. The sophists, Isocrates and Plato are, of course, predated by the Pre-Socratics, the former in many ways advancing the conversation begun by the latter. See Merrill Ring, Beginning with the Pre-Socratics.

2. The great exception to this would be that of Sparta, which enforced a structured militaristic education sanctioned by the state with the expressed purpose of developing a strong military society. See H. I. Marrou, A History of Education in Antiquity, and also R.C. Lodge, Plato’s Theory of Education.

3. See H. I. Marrou, A History of Education in Antiquity.

4. What we would today call science, which includes physics, biology, astronomy, and so on. Though it is important to recognize that no scientific method existed in ancient Greece, and these undertakings largely consisted of making hypotheses in the form of natural rather than supernatural explanations.

5. See Edith Hamilton, The Echo of Greece.

6. Aristotle sees a place for rhetoric, but he does not equate it with the whole of virtue, but strictly a part. See Aristotle, Rhetoric. The role of contemplation is discussed by Aristotle in the Eudemian and Nicomachean Ethics. See also, Aristotle, Metaphysics.

7. It should be noted that both Plato and Aristotle were limited by the social settings in which their lives were situated. See Alasdair MacIntyre, A Short History of Ethics.

8. It should also be pointed out that such a structure enabled non-instrumental forms of education as well. But the structure provided an arena in which instrumental forms of education could be exercised, where non-instrumental forms need no such arena.

9. See Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition.

10. See H. I. Marrou, A History of Education in Antiquity.

11. Cicero considers the immense power wielded by those skilled in rhetoric and oratory, and searches for ways to prevent such people from abusing their power. See Cicero, On The Orator.

12. See Norman F. Cantor, The Civilization of the Middle Ages.

13. Ibid.

14. Note here that classical texts adopt an instrumental role in the dissemination of Latin.

15. See Norman F. Cantor, The Civilization of the Middle Ages.

16. The study of law is almost always such that it contains a goal of application. Few people study law, or have studied it, simply to contemplate it. The point of it is more likely to pursue a form of legal practice. In this way it can be characterized as instrumental. See also Harold J. Berman, Law and Revolution: The Formation of the Western Legal Tradition.

17. Ibid.

18. Note that the study of theology, itself non-instrumental, can in certain circumstances become instrumental. e.g., as a means to potentially enter the upper circles of ecclesiastical authority in order to obtain a position of power (especially in the Middle Ages).

19. Aquinas’ work was later vindicated. In 1567 Pope Pius V declared Aquinas a Doctor of the Church, and in 1879 Pope Leo XIII published the encyclical letter Aeterni Patris, which stated Aquinas’ theology should be understood as definitive of Catholic doctrine.

20. Of course a role was played by the Scientific Revolution, though I think this adds unnecessary complexities to the considerations of this essay. The work of Francis Bacon is illustrative, especially since it predates much of the Scientific Revolution. Bacon clearly advocates application and instrumentality, and, like Isocrates, views utility as the standard of the good. See Francis Bacon, Novum Organum.

21. This can be seen in a common question posed to young adults considering a degree: How many jobs are there in that field?

22. This was the impetus behind the publication of the Great Books of the Western World. Further distant, though still modern, is the work of John Henry Newman, The Idea of a University. In some ways the views of Petrarch and Renaissance humanism can be seen in this light. It should also be said that a great many individuals, alumni, and university staff, endorse the idea of higher education as properly and essentially non-instrumental.

23. See Alasdair MacIntyre, Whose Justice? Which Rationality?

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