Human action takes place within the space of the human world. But while the human world is the stage upon which human actions are performed, it also provides the context which renders our actions intelligible to others as well as ourselves. There is no such thing as an abstracted human action, existing apart and independently from its context–such a thing is unintelligible. Human actions, therefore, must possess the property of intelligibility.1 In order to avoid potential misunderstandings, it is important to remember that I am talking about those actions which are distinctively and characteristically human. Breathing could be construed as an action: the taking in of oxygen and expulsion of carbon dioxide by the lungs. But breathing is not a human action because it does not properly take place within the human world.2 Speech, however, is an example of human action, since to speak a language is to communicate within a given context of a shared social understanding. We must begin with considerations of human action if we wish to sufficiently understand not only the notions of virtue and practical rationality (ethics), and the narrative character of human life, but also to place ourselves in a position to evaluate competing views in ethics, personal identity, and others.
At the end of the previous essay, The Individual and The Human World, two competing viewpoints were invoked to partly introduce the relationship between the individual and the world. The second of the two, that of modern liberal individualism, seeks to abstract the individual from the social context which renders him or her intelligible. This is perhaps best exemplified by the work of René Descartes, whose philosophical projects largely strip the self of every characteristic except that of subjective awareness.3 Here we have the self literally disembodied, abstracted from everything hitherto playing a role in its existence.
Thus stripped, action becomes intelligible on the sole basis of will, perhaps subcategorized as beliefs, intentions, motives, and so forth. It is by willing to do this or that, that the self acts in the world. One problem with this view is that, although the self is conceptualized as prior to and independent of context and social setting, the self never actually exists in this way. But this thinking nonetheless has had its affect on the world, where actions are increasingly viewed atomistically, in terms of simple and isolated components.4 “He went to the store.” “She drove to work.” “The kids went to school.” Our lives become comprised of a sequence of disconnected activities, events, and episodes. The public, the professional, the private. Childhood and old age are partitioned from the rest of life, becoming distinct and isolated realms. The self becomes the connecting link; the necessary adhesive to bring together the disconnected activities and aspects of a given life.5 But what, exactly, is the self? If action is understood in terms of the will, and the will is understood in terms of the self, what then is the self understood in terms of?6 Answering this question–or attempting to answer it–is somewhat premature, and I will postpone the question of personal identity for the time being.
I have noted that within the schema of the abstracted self action becomes intelligible in terms of the will, i.e., beliefs, intentions, etc. And while we cannot characterize actions independently of beliefs or intentions, we also cannot characterize beliefs or intentions independently of the settings which make them intelligible. Actions, again, must be intelligible.7 That beliefs, intentions, and ultimately human actions derive their intelligibility as parts of larger wholes is a viewpoint largely at odds with the dominant paradigms of modernity.8 Yet this is nonetheless inescapable if we are to adequately capture the human condition and experience. Here we are brought to that rival and largely premodern conception of the relationship between the individual and the world, that of placing the individual within the context of the social.9 On this view, for human actions to be intelligible they must be understood as existing within a context of some sort. When the context is stripped away, they become unintelligible.
As an initial example, if I come across someone crying, the fact that they are crying–by itself–can not provide me with an adequate account of what is going on. Whereas if I am attending a funeral, for example, the act of crying becomes intelligible without the need for further inquiry. In the absence of an intelligible setting, like that of a funeral, to come across someone crying is to observe behavior without context. Although crying is indicative of different things–such as extreme joy or sorrow, among others–its intelligibility will be hidden from us until we understand its context.10 Asking a question, such as “Are you alright?”, just is such an attempt to inquire into the context of the behavior in question.
In the opening paragraph, I mentioned that speech is an obvious human action because it takes place within the context of a shared social understanding–a specific language. To find people actively engaged in a lengthy conversation, for instance, is to enter into a context already presupposed by the participants. Upon walking up, we may hear words and sentences–which may in themselves be inherently meaningful: “No, I don’t think so.”, “Yes, that’s right.”–but what exactly is going on will be unintelligible until we learn the context of what is being said. To speak a language foreign to those around you is likewise to act unintelligibly–the shared social understanding of the language is not present to them–even though the act may be perfectly intelligible to you. The challenges of communication within the contemporary world are thus challenges–or illusions–of intelligibility.
Consider also the examples of isolated events mentioned above. “He went to the store.” “She drove to work.” “The kids went to school.” Each event is made up of a sequence of behavior that is only intelligible within the context of a larger whole. Take going to the store, which involves a multitude of isolated or individuated actions–part of which may involve but not be limited to things like getting dressed, putting on one’s shoes, getting the keys, driving to the store, shopping for a set of items, paying for them, driving home, unloading the car, etc. Notice that within these sequences we could include a myriad of others: walking, bending down, reaching, tying one’s shoes; driving involves many things, such as starting the car, using turn signals, pressing the gas and brake pedals, monitoring speed, observing surrounding traffic and street conditions, listening to the radio, parking upon arrival, and so on. There may be a predetermined list of items or groceries needed, which must be individually located, placed within a cart or basket–each requiring a separate set of individuated actions–spontaneous purchases may occur, friends or acquaintances may be encountered, speech engaged in, and on and on. Notice that picking out a single action within this large and diverse sequence of actions, and isolating it as “an action” or some such thing, renders it, in its own terms, unintelligible. The reason reaching for the car keys is intelligible to us as an action–to pick out one from a multitude–is because it exists within the context of a larger whole that is, in this case, going to the store. The sequences of actions involved in going to the store are likewise only intelligible within a wider context–groceries are needed for the family, a dinner is planned for a special guest, a festive party is being held. That food is needed, or a special dinner or party is planned, is likewise intelligible only with reference to still other contexts: a daily cycle of domestic activity in the former, a narrative history of friendship in the latter.
When I said previously that the individual is at best the co-author of his or her life, what I mean is that we are born into a set of circumstances that exist entirely beyond and independently of ourselves. This totality of circumstances which we are born into, the world and its historical characteristics, existed before us and will exist after our bones turn to dust. We are born into a world–the human world–which we did not design or create;11 we are born at a specific time and place, within a specific milieu, to a specific family and set of parents; we are born with a specific genetic makeup, with its corresponding strengths and weaknesses. We are thus thrust into a structure of circumstances which opens up a field of both potential and limitation for our lives. Limitation–which constrains our experience to a specific historical epoch, with its attending technology, culture, traditions, economic and political structures, the people with whom we share the narrative of our life, as well as our own physical limitations. Potential–in terms of what we may do within the unique structure of the world into which we are born. It is this world, with its interconnected and overlapping layers of context, that enable the things we do to be intelligible to ourselves and others.
Notes:
1. In this essay I am largely drawing upon the work of Alasdair MacIntyre. Specifically After Virtue, ch. 15, but also his paper, “The Intelligibility of Action”, published in 1986. See Margolis, J., Krausz, M. and Burian, R.M., (eds.) Rationality, Relativism and the Human Sciences.
2. Breathing is rather a necessary condition of the human world; a biological precondition. Other reasons could be given for breathing not qualifying as a human action, such as breathing is not unique to humans, or is not a form of purposive activity (it is done automatically by the nervous system).
3. René Descartes is considered by some to be the father of modern philosophy. It is at the very least clear that after Descartes we find a steadily growing hegemony of subjective experience as the primary starting point in philosophy. His influence on Jean-Paul Sartre, for instance, is well-known. See René Descartes, Meditiations on First Philosophy.
4. While this understanding of action is common in analytical philosophy, it also plays a fundamental role in many of the purported explanations of Neuroscience. See Raymond Tallis, Aping Mankind. See also, M.R. Bennett and P.M.S. Hacker, Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience.
5. It is perhaps important to emphasize that I am not laying the reality of this situation at the feet of René Descartes, or even modern philosophy in general. I have said before that I think the situation is far more complex than a simple trickle down intellectual model. The focus here is not on genealogy or genesis, but on articulation of current modes of thought and understanding.
6. René Descartes’ answer: The mind, or “spirit” as some would say. John Locke’s answer: Consciousness, especially that persisting through time. Jean-Paul Sartre’s answer: Nothingness, which for him is also the liberating condition of freedom, and self-creation. See Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness.
7. The hallmark trait of those admitted to psychiatric hospitals is that their behavior is unintelligible.
8. This point is made by both Alasdair MacIntyre and Raymond Tallis, albeit in very different ways. Where MacIntyre is concerned with an articulation and exposition of the virtues in contradistinction to what modernity can coherently support, Tallis is critical of the purported explanations of behavior found in contemporary Neuroscience.
9. It is somewhat misleading to speak of the relationship between the “individual” and the world as premodern, since the concept of the individual is a creation of the early modern or late medieval world. The premodern world largely views the self as inhabiting a given role within the structure of society, rather than as an abstracted individual.
10. Although the context is hidden from us, it is not hidden from the person crying. Indeed, that they are crying would indicate that their behavior is intelligible to themselves.
11. This may appear to contradict what I said in the previous essay, when I said the human world “has been collectively created by ourselves.” What I mean in this instance is that the human world pre-exists our own existence; it is a world we are all born into, which has been created by those who came before us. It is equally the case that we contribute to this world through the narrative of our unique life. Thus, the human world that future generations are born into will be a world that we have contributed to.